A Condorcet voting scheme chooses a winning candidate as one who defeats all others in pairwise majority rule. We provide a review which includes the rigorous mathematical treatment for calculating the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any number of candidates and value of n odd or even and with arbitrary rank order probabilities, when the voters are independent. We provide a compact and complete Table for the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner with three candidates and arbitrary rank order probabilities. We present a simple proof of a result of May to show the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner tends to zero as the number of candidates tends to infinity. We show for the first time that the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any given number of candidates m is monotone decreasing in m for the equally likely case. This, in turn, settles the conjectures of Kelly and Buckley and Westen for the case n → ∞. We prove the validity of Gillett's conjecture on the minimum value of the probability of a Condorcet winner for m = 3 and any n. We generalize this result for any m and n and obtain the minimum solution and the minimum probability of a Condorcet winner.
Introduction
Different voting procedures (see for example [22] Page 147) for electing a leader or deciding a candidate or a judgment have been proposed in the literature. In all voting procedures, we assume that the voter rank orders the candidate or decision from highest to lowest. One of the most used schemes is a majority rule, in which a candidate or decision is ranked first by more than half the number of voters. An example of the majority rule is the U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Another selection strategy is the plurality rule in which a candidate is ranked first by the largest number of voters. An example of the plurality rule is the U.S. presidential election. In the Condorcet scheme, a candidate is chosen who defeats all others in pairwise majority rule. An example of the Condorcet scheme is the selection of job candidates or proposals to be funded in academic departments and by funding agencies or for determining winners in tournaments.
While the Condorcet scheme is a transitive in individual voter's choices, there are many instances in which a majority winner may not exist [23] [19] . For example, let there be 3 voters (V 1 , V 2 , V 3 ) and 3 candidates (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ). V 1 rank orders C 1 C 2 C 3 , V 2 rank orders C 2 C 3 C 1 and finally V 3 rank orders C 3 C 1 C 2 . In this voting example, C 1 is preferred over C 2 two out of three times. Similarly C 2 is preferred over C 3 and C 3 is preferred over C 1 two out of three times. Hence there is no one with majority preferences over all pairs. So according to the Condorcet scheme, there is no winner in this case.
In past research work, it has been assumed that a probability distribution is given to all the rank orders. It is also assumed in most studies that all voters vote independently. Previous researchers have calculated the probability of a Condorcet winner using analytical and simulation models [17] by making simplifying assumptions on the probability distributions. Asymptotic expressions for the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner (i.e., when the number of voters → ∞) have been obtained [14] [12] [9] [23] [19] . A survey of previous research in this area may be found in [10] .
The focus of the present paper is on the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner when the number of voters, n, tend to infinity for a given number m of candidates and arbitrary probability distribution on the m! rankings. We present a review and some new results in this part of the study. While researchers in this area, notably for example, Niemi and Weisberg [23] , Garman and Kamien [9] have noted the relationship of the limit with certain multivariate normal probabilities, there doesn't exist a statistically rigorous proof of this result in order to justify the evaluation of the limit for various cases. Further it is often assumed that the number of candidates is odd, see Niemi and Weisberg [23] . We close this gap with this paper by providing a rigorous statistical proof for any number of candidates, the number of voters both odd and even, and arbitrary probability distributions, usually referred to as culture probabilities. In section 2, we show further that for any number of candidates and with arbitrary probability distributions on the preference ranking, the limiting probability depends on the calculation of positive orthant probabilities of appropriate multinormal distributions. We also provide a compact and complete Table covering all possible cases for computing the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner when the number of candidates is 3 and with arbitrary probability distribution among the rank orders. We show that the limiting probability as n → ∞ for any number of candidates m is monotone decreasing in m which partially validates Kelly [18] and Buckley and Westen [4] conjectures. We also present a simple proof of May's result [19] that the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for equally likely case tends to zero as the number of candidates gets larger. We also prove Gillett's [15] conjecture on the minimum probability of a Condorcet number for 3 candidates and any number of voters. We extend the result to any m and n and obtain the minimum value and solution. In Section 5, we treat the case of m = 4 candidates with arbitrary probabilities p i and show that it is possible to have exact expressions for the limiting Condorcet winner probability for all possible scenarios.
Condorcet Winner: Statistical Formulation and Results for General Case
In this section, we present a statistical derivation of the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner when the voters are independent and the number of voters is large. Let m = Number of Candidates n = Number of Voters
We have K = m! preference rankings of m candidates. A voter will choose one of these rankings. We assume that the voters act independently. Let p i be the probability that a voter prefers the rank order i, for i = 1, 2, · · · , K.
Further, we know that p i ≥ 0 and
Let N i be the number of voters voting for the ith preference ranking, for i = 1, 2, · · · , K. We therefore have
where the n i 's are nonnegative integers with
It is known that (see, for example, [5] 
Denote the m candidates by C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C m . Write C i P C j , i = j if C i is preferred to C j by a voter. Define C i MC j , i = j if C i beats C j by majority rule. i.e., the total number of voters preferring C i to C j is more than the total number of voters preferring C j to C i . This fact can be mathematically expressed as
where the a l,(i,j) 's are ± 1. a l,(i,j) = 1, if in the lth preference ranking voted by the N l voters, C i P C j . Similarly a l,(i,j) = − 1 if C j P C i is the preference ranking voted by N l voters. Clearly
of the a l,(i,j) 's are 1 and
of the a l,(i,j) 's are equal to -1. Equation (2) implies that the difference between the number of voters preferring C i to C j and the number of voters preferring C j to C i is at least 1. We define, for example, C i to be the Condorcet winner if and only if C i MC j for each j = 1, 2, · · · , m and j = i. For example, the probability that C 1 is the Condorcet winner is the probability of the joint event
Condition (3) lead to what is defined as 'strong' winner. Replacing all the 1's by 0's lead to the definition of a 'weak' winner. For small values n and m , this probability can be computed using the multinomial distribution (1). We are interested in finding lim n→∞ P (One of the C i is a Condorcet winner) for a given value of m. Several researchers have attempted to find this limit or an approximation to it. Gilbaud [14] gave an expression of this limit for m = 3, when all the p i 's are equal (Impartial Culture or IC model), though he did not explain the method. Garmen and Kamien [9] derived the expression for the limiting Condorcet winner probability for m = 3 and m = 4 for the Impartial Culture model without giving details. Jones et al [17] , Bell [2] and Niemi et al [23] obtained approximations to it by extensive simulations or quadrature methods attributed to Ruben [25] for the Impartial Culture (IC) model i.e., when all the preference rankings are equal.
Niemi and Weisberg [23] and Garman and Kamien [9] were the first to relate the limit or an approximation to it with the calculation of certain multivariate normal probabilities. Niemi et al [23] assume n to be an odd number and Garman et al [9] indicate the relation in a footnote. However, they do not present a rigorous statistical proof that the limit is exactly a multivariate normal probability for any general culture probabilities. They state that the multivariate normality is achieved by the fact that the multinomial distribution tends to the multivariate normal distribution. The multivariate normality however, is the consequence of the fact that a set of linear combinations of N i values, defined by equation (2), tends to the multivariate normal distribution by the application of multivariate central limit theorem, as we proceed to show here. In this section we show a rigorous statistical derivation of the limit which covers the cases when n is odd or even.
Most researchers in this area have focused on the odd n (number of voters) case. This is because ties do not occur while determining the majority rule; i.e., for odd number of voters n, the number of voters preferring C i to C j will never equal the voters preferring C j to C i . However, if n is even there is a positive probability of having a tie. We show, in what follows, that the probability of a tie for n even tends to zero as n → ∞. Let p ij = r p r the with summation extending over the preference rankings in which C i is preferred over C j and let T denote the total number of voters preferring C i to C j . Then, it is well known from Multinomial distribution theory that T is a Binomial variable with n and p ij as parameters. The probability of a tie in the majority determination between C i and C j is
We know by Stirling's approximation [5] Page 130, that
The symbol ∼ = means
→ 1 as n → ∞. Applying this to equation (4) and noting that
for all 0 ≤ p ij ≤ 1, we can verify that
For the voter profile (
above representation has been used in Bell ([2] ) and Gehrlein ([12] ). Note that
We also need to obtain the correlation coefficient between X(i, j, v) and X(i, l, v), i = j, i = l and j = l. To express correlation, we first define a r,(i,j),l = 1 if in the preference ranking corresponding to N r , r = 1, · · · , K is
Covariance is defined by the following equation.
The correlation between X(i, j, v) and X(i, l, v) is given by
Note that the (m − 1) random variables y(i, j, v), j = 1, · · · , m, j = i have a joint distribution with zero mean vector, unit variances and Correlation matrix R i . From (9), the probability that C i MC j is given by
The probability that C i is the Condorcet winner is therefore given by the joint probability
By the multivariate central limit theorem (See Cramèr [6] , Page 112) applied to independent summands Z n (i, j),j = 1, · · · , m, j = i, the joint distribution of
tends as n → ∞ to the (m − 1) dimensional multivariate normal distribution with zero mean vector, unit variances and correlation matrix R i = (R (i) jl ). Let us write
Denote by L(h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h m−1 ; R) the multivariate normal probability
has the multivariate normal distribution with zero mean vector, unit variances and Correlation matrix R. Then we have
The limiting probability of a Condorcet winner is then
Equation (13) shows that the limiting Condorcet winner probability is obtained as the sum of m L-functions. The arguments of the L functions are either +∞ or −∞ or 0. If at least one of the arguments in a L function is +∞, the function value is 0 by the definition of the L-function. We can also drop all the arguments with value −∞ and calculate the reduced L-function from the marginal multivariate normal distribution. It is therefore interesting to note that even for arbitrary probability distribution p i 's, at worst we have to evaluate positive orthant probabilities of a multivariate normal distribution. We shall give examples for the case m = 3 and m = 4 in later sections and provide a scheme to obtain the exact limiting probability expressions for a Condorcet winner for any choice of p i 's.
Equation (13) can also be specialized to the Dual Culture(DC) Model. A preference rank order is the dual of another ranking if each can be obtained by reversing the order of the other. For example, if m = 4, rank order
In this case it is clear from the definition of λ ij that all the λ ij ≡ 0. This, in turn, implies that δ ij ≡ 0. Equation (13) shows then that the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner under DC models
Note that in each L function, there are (m−1) zeroes. Gehrlein [11] gives the exact expressions for m = 3 and m = 4.
Condorcet Winner: Some Special Cases
First we assume that all preference rankings for a voter are equally likely. This implies that p i ≡ 1/K, for i = 1, · · · , K. For this case, symmetry conditions imply that λ ij ≡ 0 for i = 1, · · · , m , j = 1, · · · , m and i = j ⇒ δ ij ≡ 0. For this case, it can be verified from [13] that R i ≡ R * where R * is the (m−1) ×(m−1) equicorrelated matrix with equal correlation value = 1/3. The limiting probability of a Condorcet winner from (13) is given by
This expression for m = 3 was obtained by Gilbaud ([14] ) as
arcsin ( 1 3 ). Garman and Kamien [9] [13] , Jones et al [17] and Niemi et al [23] . The expression (14) [7] , Sondhi [26] , Placket [24] , Ruben [25] , Johnson and Kotz [16] and Bacon [1] . Bacon [1] and hence a = 1. Thus
It is also known that L m−1 (ρ) for m being even can be obtained recursively from L i (ρ) for i ≤ m − 2:
See Johnson and Kotz [16] Pages 48-52 for more details. We obtained the expression for m = 6 using the recursion formula.
For m > 7, Bacon [1] provides an approximation believed to be reasonably close to the true value. Figure 1 shows the plot of P (m) for increasing values of m based on these approximations. May [19] has shown that P (m) → 0, as m → ∞ at the rate of 1 m . His proof is based on saddle point approximation of an integral and it appears to be complicated and difficult to understand. We present a direct proof of this result.
From (14) and (15), we have
Applying Cauchy-Schwarz's inequality
to the above equation, we get
Note that
We proved that the limiting probability P (m) of a Condorcet winner tends to zero as m → ∞. We show in addition thatP (m) is monotonically decreasing in m. This settles Kelly's [18] and Buckley and Westen's [4] conjecture for large values of n. This monotonicity property, we believe, is new.
Proposition: P (m + 1) < P (m)
Proof: From Equations (14) and (15), we have to show that
where φ(t) = pdf of standard normal distribution. The right side of equation (19) equals after integrating by parts
Similarly the right side of equation (18) equals
Thus it is enough to show
Split the region of integration into 0 −∞ + ∞ 0 ,put t = −y in the first integral and after simplification and noting 1 − Φ(−y) = Φ(y), it reduces to show that
Write Φ(y) = z and note that the left hand side of equation (21) equals
and so on. Hence the expression in the square brackets of equation (20) =
Thus the integrand in equation (20) is >0 and hence the left side of equation (20) is > 0.
Condorcet Winner: Special Case m = 3 candidates
Niemi et al [23] calculated the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner values for n = 1..49, utilizing the table of Ruben [25] . Ruben used quadrature methods and recursive formulas to obtain these values. May [19] and Garman et al [9] discussed the case of 3 candidates to obtain the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner. Gehrlein [11] discusses several possibilities that may arise in obtaining the value for m = 3. We give a compact and complete Table for all possible p i 's utilizing the results of Section 2 and (13) of this paper. Suppose the 6 rankings are Rankings Number of Voters Probabilities
It can be verified that
The three correlation matrices R 1 , R 2 , R 3 are given by:
The (1,2) entry of R 2 is R 2 13 .
12 . The probability of a Condorcet winner is
By considering the 27 possibilities with which λ 12 , λ 13 and λ 23 can take zero, positive and negative values, we can simplify the expression further. Table  1 shows the 27 possible cases and the corresponding limiting value of the probability of a Condorcet winner. A set of different values is obtained for varying values of p i 's. It is also to be noted that for a few alternatives the values of 0 and 1 are obtained for the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner. See alternatives 7 and 17 in Table 1 . Table 1 provides the reference table to calculate the exact limiting probability for any choice of p i , i = 1, · · · , 6. One of the 27 possibilities will apply in a given situation and one can read off or calculate the value. It is seen from Table 1 that only in two cases out of 27, the limiting probability is definitely 0. In 12 cases (more than 40%) the probability is 1 and in almost all cases the probability will be at least 50%. These observations are consistent with often stated conclusion that for small number of candidates and large number of votes, the Condercet scheme will produce a winner. It can be verified that case 7, for example, is reached when p 1 = p 2 = p 5 = and p 6 = 0. For another set of examples for m = 3, see May [19] , Garman et al [9] and Meyer et al [20] .
For example, the trivial set of probabilities p i = 1, p j = 0, j = i will produce a Condorcet winner for every n and hence the limit is also 1 as n → ∞. Choose the probabilities p i such that , (12), it follows immediately that in every L term, one of the arguments is a +∞. This implies that the limiting Condorcet winner probability is 0. Thus for every m, we can choose p i so that the limiting Condorcet winner is 0.
Gillett [15] conjectured that the probability of a Condorcet winner P (3, n; p) for m = 3 candidates and any n, the number of voters, is minimized for
Buckley [3] proved this conjecture for the special case n = 3. We will show the validity of the conjecture for general n.
The probability of candidate C 1 being the majority winner is
since N 3 and N 4 are non-negative random variables. The above expression is greater than or equal to
, again for the same reason with regard to N 2 . N 1 is distributed as a Binomial variable with n and p 1 .
where B(k; n, p 1 ) is the Binomial cumulative distribution with parameters n and
if n is odd and k = n 2 if n is even. From the relation of B(k; n, p 1 ) with Incomplete Beta function, see Feller(1957) page 127, [8] ,
Continuing similar arguments for C 2 and C 3 being majority winners, we have
Consider minimizing the following function
We proceed to show that an optimal solution to the problem defined by (25) 
For
In order that p i 's satisfy the constraints of equation (25), we cannot have two of the p i 's are ≥ , which implies that the other two < k n−1 , the Hessian matrix will have its determinant a negative value because of equation (26) . Note that the Hessian is a diagonal matrix. Thus such a solution cannot be a local minimum. Therefore we can confine our solution to the region in which all the p i 's ≤ and repeat the whole argument with p 2 , p 3 , p 6 as variables and consider the minimization problem of minimizing the following function.
As before, the minimum solution of equation (27) ; p 2 = p 3 = p 6 = 0. Note that our arguments show that p 2 = p 3 = p 6 = 1 3
; p 1 = p 4 = p 5 = 0 is also optimal. Denote byp * the solution
be the value of the objective function of (25) . We have shown that for any choice ofp (22) We will now show that P (3, n;p * ) = 3(1 − B(k; n, )) which concludes thatp * yields the minimum value of P (3, n;p). Since p 2 * = p 3 * = p 6 * = 0, we have P (3, n;p . This establishes the conjecture. Note that the minimum value for the probability of a Condorcet winner is given by
or an equivalent integral representation
We will establish that this solution yields the minimum for the probability of a Condorcet winner P (m, n;p) for a general probability distributionp. We use the same approach that was used for m = 3 case. It is shown first along similar lines that
From an argument similar to the case m = 3, it is shown that
Next it follows that from (28) and the definition of a Condorcet winner, P (m, n;p * ) forp * given by p i * = 1 m , for i = 1, · · · , m and p i * = 0 for i ≥ (m + 1) the probability of C 1 winning is
Similarly it is verified that the probability of C 2 winning is
and so on. Hence
which equals the bound in (31). Hencep * yields the minimum for the probability of a Condorcet winner. Table 2 gives the minimum probability of a Condorcet winner for selected values of m and n.
Condorcet Winner: Special Case m=4 candidates
For this case, we show that it is possible to obtain, for any choice of p i , i = 1, 2, · · · , 24, exact limiting probability of a Condorcet winner. We first calculate the six quantities λ 12 , λ 13 , λ 14 , λ 23 , λ 24 and λ 34 from (6). Then define δ 12 , δ 13 , δ 14 , δ 23 , δ 24 and δ 34 as stated in Section 2. Also calculate the correlation matrices R i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4. In this case, there are 3 6 = 729 possibilities for the λ ij 's to be > 0 or < 0 or = 0. It will be unwieldy to prepare a Table containing all these 729 cases. We show how the limiting probability can be calculated for any given situation. The limiting probability of Condorcet winner follows from (13) .
Consider the calculation of L(δ 12 , δ 13 , δ 14 ; R 1 ). Calculations for other Lfactors are similar. To obtain this, we need at the worst to calculate
, where Φ is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. Bacon [1] gives exact expressions for those L functions as
The calculation of this L for other possible arguments is by inspection or it will reduce to one of the above 3 cases with arguments equal to zero. This example illustrates the comment made immediately after equation (13) that the only calculations, if any, involve calculating the positive orthant probabilities of appropriate multivariate normal distribution. Thus for any one of the 729 possibilities that is reached in a given case, we can calculate the exact limiting probability of a Condorcet winner.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a rigorous mathematical treatment for calculating the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any number of candidates and with arbitrary rank order probabilities, when the voters are independent. We show further that the limiting probability depends only on the positive orthant probabilities of an appropriate multinormal distribution even for arbitrary probabilities of the preference rank order probabilities. We provide approximate limiting probabilities for a Condorcet winner for any number of candidates and equal rank order probabilities. We provide a compact and complete Table for the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner with 3 candidates and arbitrary rank order probabilities. We present a simple proof of a result of May [19] to show that the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner tends to zero as the number of candidates tends to infinity. We also present a scheme for calculating the exact limiting probability for m = 4 candidates and arbitrary probability distributions on the preference rank orders. We show for the first time that the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any given number of candidates m is monotone decreasing in m for the equally likely case. This, in turn, settles the conjectures of Kelly [18] and Buckley and Westen [4] for the case n → ∞. We prove the validity of Gillett's [15] conjecture on the minimum value of the probability of a Condorcet winner for m = 3 and any n. Extending the result we obtain the minimum value and the minimum solution for any n and m. arcsin(R arcsin(R 
